fix(security): close MED Ghost error leak + 3 LOWs from certification audit#67
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The third certification audit on patched main returned 0 CRITICAL,
0 HIGH, 1 MED, 3 LOW. Closes:
1. Ghost API error body leak (MED — internal/devdb/ghost/errors.go).
wrapHTTPError echoed the full response body into every error
string. Ghost responses can include DSN fragments and internal
session tokens; those landed in operator logs and CI archives via
any caller's `log.Printf`. New `safeBody`:
- Caps body at 256 bytes so a verbose HTML error can't flood logs.
- Redacts URL-form DSN passwords (postgres://user:pass@…) to
`user:***@…`.
- Redacts key/value `password=…` to `password=***`.
Four new tests pin truncation, URL redaction, key/value redaction,
and pass-through of benign content.
2. SetTemplateFlag boolean via fmt.Sprintf (LOW — devdb/docker/pg.go).
Safe today via Go typing, but a future refactor that changes `on`
from bool to string could silently reintroduce SQL injection.
Replaced with `$1`/`$2` placeholders matching every other query in
the file. Latent issue closed at zero cost.
3. SQLite schema-evolution contract (LOW — internal/state/sqlite.go).
The audit flagged that CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS alone doesn't
evolve existing schemas. Existing behaviour already pairs base
creates with ALTER TABLE ADD COLUMN via tryMigrate (added earlier
this session); now an explicit SCHEMA EVOLUTION header in the
comment documents the contract so future contributors know to
append to the migrations slice rather than rely on IF NOT EXISTS.
4. VXD_SHELL trust boundary documented (LOW — internal/shellexec).
The audit noted VXD_SHELL substitutes the shell binary entirely
and an attacker controlling the process environment could redirect
to an arbitrary binary. New SECURITY / TRUST BOUNDARY block in the
package doc explicitly states VXD_SHELL is NEVER read from
`vxd.yaml` — only from the live process environment — so a future
refactor that wires it to a YAML field will notice the gap.
All 28 packages still pass with -count=1.
tzone85
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Jun 16, 2026
The third certification audit on patched main returned 0 CRITICAL,
0 HIGH, 1 MED, 3 LOW. Closes:
1. Ghost API error body leak (MED — internal/devdb/ghost/errors.go).
wrapHTTPError echoed the full response body into every error
string. Ghost responses can include DSN fragments and internal
session tokens; those landed in operator logs and CI archives via
any caller's `log.Printf`. New `safeBody`:
- Caps body at 256 bytes so a verbose HTML error can't flood logs.
- Redacts URL-form DSN passwords (postgres://user:pass@…) to
`user:***@…`.
- Redacts key/value `password=…` to `password=***`.
Four new tests pin truncation, URL redaction, key/value redaction,
and pass-through of benign content.
2. SetTemplateFlag boolean via fmt.Sprintf (LOW — devdb/docker/pg.go).
Safe today via Go typing, but a future refactor that changes `on`
from bool to string could silently reintroduce SQL injection.
Replaced with `$1`/`$2` placeholders matching every other query in
the file. Latent issue closed at zero cost.
3. SQLite schema-evolution contract (LOW — internal/state/sqlite.go).
The audit flagged that CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS alone doesn't
evolve existing schemas. Existing behaviour already pairs base
creates with ALTER TABLE ADD COLUMN via tryMigrate (added earlier
this session); now an explicit SCHEMA EVOLUTION header in the
comment documents the contract so future contributors know to
append to the migrations slice rather than rely on IF NOT EXISTS.
4. VXD_SHELL trust boundary documented (LOW — internal/shellexec).
The audit noted VXD_SHELL substitutes the shell binary entirely
and an attacker controlling the process environment could redirect
to an arbitrary binary. New SECURITY / TRUST BOUNDARY block in the
package doc explicitly states VXD_SHELL is NEVER read from
`vxd.yaml` — only from the live process environment — so a future
refactor that wires it to a YAML field will notice the gap.
All 28 packages still pass with -count=1.
Co-authored-by: Thando Mini <tzone85@users.noreply.github.com>
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Summary
Closes the 1 MED + 3 LOW from the third certification audit on patched main. After this PR all CRITICAL + HIGH + MED categories the auditor checked are clean, and the LOWs are either real fixes or explicit trust-boundary documentation.
Ghost error redaction (MED)
New `safeBody` helper:
4 tests: truncation, URL-form redaction, key/value redaction, benign content pass-through.
SetTemplateFlag parameterization (LOW)
`UPDATE pg_database SET datistemplate = $1 WHERE datname = $2` — matches every other query in the file. Safe today via Go typing, but a future refactor that changes `on` from `bool` to `string` can't silently reintroduce SQL injection.
Documentation closures
Test plan