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18 changes: 18 additions & 0 deletions skills/identity/zero-trust-assessment/SKILL.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -222,6 +222,11 @@ ZT-NET-08: DNS traffic unencrypted and unmonitored
ZT-NET-09: No NDR capability — lateral movement detection is blind spot
ZT-NET-10: Microsegmentation policies not dynamically updated based on threat intelligence
ZT-NET-11: Legacy protocols (Telnet, FTP, unencrypted LDAP) in use
ZT-NET-12: Private app connector fails open — traffic bypasses connector on outage instead of failing closed
ZT-NET-13: Emergency bypass for private apps persists after outage resolution (no expiry, no owner, no audit trail)
ZT-NET-14: Split DNS exposes internal app addresses directly when connector is down
ZT-NET-15: Connector health check passes but policy sync is stale or failing silently
ZT-NET-16: Private apps reachable from "trusted" network segments without policy enforcement
```

#### Microsegmentation Readiness Assessment
Expand All @@ -237,6 +242,19 @@ ZT-NET-11: Legacy protocols (Telnet, FTP, unencrypted LDAP) in use

---

#### Private App Connector Fail-Open Readiness

| Readiness Factor | Assessment Criteria |
|---|---|
| **Fail-closed behavior** | When connector is disabled or unreachable, does traffic to private apps fail closed (denied) rather than routing around the connector? |
| **Policy sync validation** | Does connector health check include policy sync status, not just connectivity heartbeat? |
| **DNS enforcement** | Are internal app DNS names only resolvable through the connector/tunnel, not via split DNS on corporate networks? |
| **Bypass governance** | Is emergency bypass time-limited, approval-required, and automatically revoked after expiry? |
| **Direct route testing** | With connector disabled, can private apps be reached via direct IP/VPN? (Should be no.) |
| **Audit trail** | Are all connector failures, bypass activations, and policy sync events logged and alerted? |

---

### Step 4: Pillar 4 — Applications & Workloads

**Objective:** Assess application security, workload protection, and secure development maturity.
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