|
| 1 | +# Custom Bindings |
| 2 | + |
| 3 | +## Summary |
| 4 | + |
| 5 | +Allow users to expose host-side functions to sandbox code via `SecureExec.bindings`. The host registers a nested object tree of functions; the sandbox receives them as a frozen namespace on the `SecureExec` global. |
| 6 | + |
| 7 | +## Motivation |
| 8 | + |
| 9 | +Users need to give sandbox code access to host capabilities beyond the built-in fs/network/process bridge — databases, caches, queues, AI models, custom APIs. Today there's no supported way to do this. Custom bindings close that gap with minimal surface area. |
| 10 | + |
| 11 | +## Design principles |
| 12 | + |
| 13 | +- The user owns the wrapper. We provide transport, not abstractions. |
| 14 | +- Same serialization as all bridge calls (V8 structured clone). No special cases. |
| 15 | +- No Rust changes. Bindings are additional entries in `bridgeHandlers`. |
| 16 | +- Frozen and namespaced. User code cannot mutate or shadow bindings. |
| 17 | + |
| 18 | +## Host API |
| 19 | + |
| 20 | +```ts |
| 21 | +const runtime = new NodeRuntime({ |
| 22 | + systemDriver: createNodeDriver(), |
| 23 | + runtimeDriverFactory: createNodeRuntimeDriverFactory(), |
| 24 | + bindings: { |
| 25 | + db: { |
| 26 | + query: async (sql: string, params: unknown[]) => db.query(sql, params), |
| 27 | + insert: async (sql: string, values: unknown[]) => db.insert(sql, values), |
| 28 | + }, |
| 29 | + cache: { |
| 30 | + get: async (key: string) => redis.get(key), |
| 31 | + set: async (key: string, val: unknown) => redis.set(key, val), |
| 32 | + }, |
| 33 | + greet: (name: string) => `Hello, ${name}!`, |
| 34 | + }, |
| 35 | +}); |
| 36 | +``` |
| 37 | + |
| 38 | +### Type |
| 39 | + |
| 40 | +```ts |
| 41 | +type BindingFunction = (...args: unknown[]) => unknown | Promise<unknown>; |
| 42 | + |
| 43 | +interface BindingTree { |
| 44 | + [key: string]: BindingFunction | BindingTree; |
| 45 | +} |
| 46 | + |
| 47 | +interface NodeRuntimeOptions { |
| 48 | + // ... existing fields ... |
| 49 | + bindings?: BindingTree; |
| 50 | +} |
| 51 | +``` |
| 52 | + |
| 53 | +### Constraints |
| 54 | + |
| 55 | +- Binding keys must be valid JS identifiers (`/^[a-zA-Z_$][a-zA-Z0-9_$]*$/`). |
| 56 | +- Max nesting depth: 4 levels. |
| 57 | +- Max leaf functions: 64 per runtime. |
| 58 | +- Bindings are set at construction and immutable for the runtime's lifetime. |
| 59 | +- Collisions with internal bridge names (anything starting with `_`) are rejected at registration time. |
| 60 | + |
| 61 | +## Sandbox API |
| 62 | + |
| 63 | +```js |
| 64 | +// Flat calls |
| 65 | +const rows = await SecureExec.bindings.db.query("SELECT * FROM users", []); |
| 66 | +await SecureExec.bindings.cache.set("key", "value"); |
| 67 | + |
| 68 | +// Sync bindings work too |
| 69 | +const msg = SecureExec.bindings.greet("world"); |
| 70 | + |
| 71 | +// Destructure for convenience |
| 72 | +const { db, cache } = SecureExec.bindings; |
| 73 | +const rows = await db.query("SELECT * FROM users", []); |
| 74 | +``` |
| 75 | + |
| 76 | +### The `SecureExec` global |
| 77 | + |
| 78 | +`globalThis.SecureExec` is a frozen object owned by the runtime. It follows the Deno/Bun convention of a PascalCase product-named global. |
| 79 | + |
| 80 | +```js |
| 81 | +SecureExec.bindings // user-provided bindings (this spec) |
| 82 | +SecureExec.version // package version (future) |
| 83 | +SecureExec.runtime // runtime metadata (future) |
| 84 | +``` |
| 85 | + |
| 86 | +- `SecureExec` is non-writable, non-configurable on `globalThis`. |
| 87 | +- `SecureExec.bindings` is a recursively frozen object tree. |
| 88 | +- Each leaf is a callable function that routes through the bridge. |
| 89 | +- If no bindings are registered, `SecureExec.bindings` is an empty frozen object. |
| 90 | +- `SecureExec` is always present, even with no bindings (stable API surface). |
| 91 | + |
| 92 | +## Internal mechanics |
| 93 | + |
| 94 | +### Flattening |
| 95 | + |
| 96 | +At registration time, the nested `BindingTree` is walked and flattened into dot-separated keys: |
| 97 | + |
| 98 | +``` |
| 99 | +{ db: { query: fn, insert: fn }, cache: { get: fn } } |
| 100 | + -> Map { |
| 101 | + "__bind.db.query" => fn, |
| 102 | + "__bind.db.insert" => fn, |
| 103 | + "__bind.cache.get" => fn, |
| 104 | + } |
| 105 | +``` |
| 106 | + |
| 107 | +The `__bind.` prefix separates user bindings from internal bridge names. These flattened entries are merged into `bridgeHandlers` before passing to `V8Session.execute()`. |
| 108 | + |
| 109 | +### Rust side |
| 110 | + |
| 111 | +No changes. The Rust side registers whatever function names appear in `bridgeHandlers`. New `__bind.*` names are registered as sync or async bridge functions automatically (async if the handler returns a Promise, sync otherwise). |
| 112 | + |
| 113 | +Note: sync/async detection happens on the host TS side at registration time. The IPC message (`BridgeCall`) already carries the call mode. The Rust side dispatches to `sync_bridge_callback` or `async_bridge_callback` based on how the function was registered. |
| 114 | + |
| 115 | +### Sandbox-side inflation |
| 116 | + |
| 117 | +During bridge code composition, a small JS snippet is appended that: |
| 118 | + |
| 119 | +1. Reads the list of `__bind.*` globals registered on `globalThis`. |
| 120 | +2. Splits each key on `.` and builds a nested object tree. |
| 121 | +3. Each leaf wraps the raw `__bind.*` global in a function call. |
| 122 | +4. Freezes the tree recursively. |
| 123 | +5. Sets `globalThis.SecureExec = Object.freeze({ bindings: tree })`. |
| 124 | + |
| 125 | +Pseudocode for the inflation snippet (~15 lines): |
| 126 | + |
| 127 | +```js |
| 128 | +(function() { |
| 129 | + const tree = {}; |
| 130 | + for (const key of __bindingKeys__) { |
| 131 | + const parts = key.split("."); |
| 132 | + let node = tree; |
| 133 | + for (let i = 0; i < parts.length - 1; i++) { |
| 134 | + node[parts[i]] = node[parts[i]] || {}; |
| 135 | + node = node[parts[i]]; |
| 136 | + } |
| 137 | + node[parts[parts.length - 1]] = globalThis["__bind." + key]; |
| 138 | + } |
| 139 | + function deepFreeze(obj) { |
| 140 | + for (const v of Object.values(obj)) { |
| 141 | + if (typeof v === "object" && v !== null) deepFreeze(v); |
| 142 | + } |
| 143 | + return Object.freeze(obj); |
| 144 | + } |
| 145 | + globalThis.SecureExec = Object.freeze({ bindings: deepFreeze(tree) }); |
| 146 | +})(); |
| 147 | +``` |
| 148 | + |
| 149 | +The `__bindingKeys__` array is injected as a JSON literal during bridge code composition. The raw `__bind.*` globals are deleted from `globalThis` after inflation (the tree holds the only references). |
| 150 | + |
| 151 | +## Serialization |
| 152 | + |
| 153 | +Arguments and return values use the existing V8 ValueSerializer pipeline (structured clone). Supported types: |
| 154 | + |
| 155 | +- Primitives (string, number, boolean, null, undefined) |
| 156 | +- Plain objects and arrays |
| 157 | +- Uint8Array / ArrayBuffer |
| 158 | +- Date, Map, Set, RegExp |
| 159 | +- Error objects |
| 160 | +- Nested/circular references |
| 161 | + |
| 162 | +Not supported (will throw): |
| 163 | +- Functions (cannot cross the bridge) |
| 164 | +- Symbols |
| 165 | +- WeakMap / WeakSet |
| 166 | +- DOM objects (not applicable) |
| 167 | + |
| 168 | +Same payload size limits as all bridge calls (`ERR_SANDBOX_PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE`). |
| 169 | + |
| 170 | +## Implementation plan |
| 171 | + |
| 172 | +### Phase 1: Core plumbing |
| 173 | + |
| 174 | +1. Add `bindings?: BindingTree` to `NodeRuntimeOptions`. |
| 175 | +2. Thread through `RuntimeDriverOptions` to `NodeExecutionDriver`. |
| 176 | +3. In `NodeExecutionDriver`, flatten `BindingTree` to `Map<string, BridgeHandler>` with `__bind.` prefix. |
| 177 | +4. Merge into `bridgeHandlers` in `executeInternal()`. |
| 178 | +5. Validate: no key collisions with internal names, all keys are valid identifiers, depth <= 4, leaf count <= 64. |
| 179 | + |
| 180 | +### Phase 2: Sandbox-side injection |
| 181 | + |
| 182 | +6. In `composeStaticBridgeCode()` or `composePostRestoreScript()`, append the inflation snippet. |
| 183 | +7. Pass binding keys list as a JSON literal injected into the snippet. |
| 184 | +8. Delete raw `__bind.*` globals after inflation. |
| 185 | +9. Ensure `SecureExec` global is present even with zero bindings. |
| 186 | + |
| 187 | +### Phase 3: Tests |
| 188 | + |
| 189 | +10. Test: host registers nested bindings, sandbox calls them, values round-trip correctly. |
| 190 | +11. Test: sync and async bindings both work. |
| 191 | +12. Test: `SecureExec.bindings` is frozen (cannot be mutated by sandbox code). |
| 192 | +13. Test: binding key validation rejects invalid identifiers, depth > 4, > 64 leaves. |
| 193 | +14. Test: binding name collision with internal bridge name is rejected. |
| 194 | +15. Test: complex types (objects, arrays, Uint8Array, Date) serialize correctly through bindings. |
| 195 | +16. Test: `SecureExec` global exists even with no bindings registered. |
| 196 | +17. Test: raw `__bind.*` globals are not accessible after inflation. |
| 197 | + |
| 198 | +## Estimated effort |
| 199 | + |
| 200 | +- ~80-100 LOC TypeScript (flattening, validation, inflation snippet, threading) |
| 201 | +- ~0 LOC Rust |
| 202 | +- ~200 LOC tests |
| 203 | +- No IPC protocol changes |
| 204 | +- No bridge contract changes (bindings are dynamic, not hardcoded) |
| 205 | + |
| 206 | +## Future extensions |
| 207 | + |
| 208 | +- `SecureExec.version` — package version string |
| 209 | +- `SecureExec.runtime` — runtime metadata (memoryLimit, timingMitigation, etc.) |
| 210 | +- Per-execution binding overrides (different bindings per `exec()`/`run()` call) |
| 211 | +- Binding middleware (logging, rate limiting, timeout per binding call) |
| 212 | +- TypeScript type generation for sandbox-side bindings (from host registration) |
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